as they were passed by parliament." 5 The Minister added that "this bill of rights, although a statute of the parliament of Canada and not an amendment to the British North America Act, will be of equal force and effect as part of the Constitution of Canada." 6 In short, the Bill of Rights would not be an ordinary law despite its legal status as just that.
Even more revealing was the admission from the government that it would have been "impossible" to enact the Bill of Rights as a constitutional amendment binding on both federal and provincial actors. 7 The government conceded that "the indications are clear that it would not be possible to get early agreement with the provinces for an amendment of the nature suggested" 8 when it was confronted with the criticism that there had been no provincial consultation and that the Bill of Rights should have introduced protections for rights and freedoms beyond only federal jurisdiction. Soon after the Bill of Rights was enacted, Bora Laskin suggested that although the Bill of Rights was a mere statute subject to ordinary repeal, it could over time become the beneficiary of "such reinforcement as may come from its public character and from public vigilance." 9 Laskin recognized that the Bill of Rights could conceivably acquire special salience in law because of its significance in society. 10 
B. Origins, Advantages and Risks
All quasi-constitutional amendments share one common point of origin, three distinct advantages, as well as three serious risks. As to their origins, quasi-constitutional amendments are the result of a self-conscious circumvention 5 . Id. at 5886.
Id.
7. Id. at 5887. of onerous rules of formal amendment in order to alter the operation of a set of existing norms in the constitution. We are likely to see quasi-constitutional amendments in states whose constitutions are difficult to amend formally, often federal countries. Where constitutional actors determine, correctly or not, that the current political landscape would frustrate their plans for a constitutional amendment to entrench new policy preferences, they resort instead to subconstitutional means-for instance, legislation or political practice-whose success requires less or perhaps even no cross-party and inter-institutional coordination.
Quasi-constitutional amendments entail three advantages for dominant constitutional actors. First, resorting to quasi-constitutional amendment allows constitutional actors to secure the functional equivalent of a constitutional amendment at a much lower political cost. Second, quasi-constitutional amendment has near-certain likelihood of success in light of the fewer veto opportunities standing in the way. Third, under the right conditions, a quasi-constitutional amendment may ultimately become as functionally durable as a formal amendment even though it may be formally subject to ordinary legislative repeal.
Yet even as quasi-constitutional amendments offer these important advantages to dominant constitutional actors, they nonetheless expose the constitution to three nontrivial risks. First, they blur the line separating the constitutional from the non-constitutional, and risk obscuring the ordinary hierarchy of authority in a constitutional democracy. Second, recourse to these sub-constitutional strategies for constitution-level changes may reveal and moreover reinforce a mismatch between constitutional design and political practice that constitutional actors can in turn exploit for politically expedient purposes. Third, circumventing the rules of formal amendment undermines the constitution itself and the very purpose of codification. I develop each of these critiques later in the text.
In this Article, I illustrate the phenomenon of quasi-constitutional amendment with reference to the Constitution of Canada-perhaps the world's most difficult to amend. I begin by identifying two additional quasi-constitutional amendments in Canada, both created after Patriation. I separate them into two major categories according to their form: one quasi-constitutional amendment made by ordinary law, and another made extra-legally outside the ordinary process of lawmaking. I then trace the phenomenon of a quasi-constitutional amendment in Canada to the difficulty of formal amendment. I subsequently explain how the legacy of formal amendment failure in Canada has made it politically attractive, if not necessary, for constitutional actors to innovate quasi-constitutional amendment as a new path to institutional reform. 20 Although the British Constitution is disaggregated over many texts and conventions, the judicial and political recognition of constitutional statutes may have the effect of creating what Perry and Farrah describe as a "graduated legal system" that distinguishes the constitutional from the non-constitutional. 21 It is in the interstices of constitutionality and sub-constitutionality that we find quasi-constitutional amendments. It is therefore possible that we might find quasi-constitutional amendments also in the few constitutional democracies like the United Kingdom with uncodified and disaggregated constitutions.
I. ONE STATUTE AND A COMMITTEE
Quasi-constitutional amendments are not all created in the same way. 22 They may arise in the course of the normal legislative process, using the same institutions and rules commonly used to pass an ordinarily-entrenched statute, and may at that time or later be identified as a quasiconstitutional amendment. Constitutional actors may also make a quasi-constitutional amendment extra-legally-that is without engaging the formal legislative process at all. In this Part, I illustrate how each of these routes has been used to produce a quasi-constitutional amendment in Canada. 22. This is an important distinction from quasi-constitutional statutes in Canada, which are enacted just as other laws are, only "they are interpreted in the broad and generous manner usually reserved for constitutional rights" and they "trump later, conflicting ordinary laws unless those laws provide otherwise. statute passed by Parliament in 1996 shortly after the 1995 Quebec referendum. 23 The Regional Veto Law fulfilled the federal government's promise to give Quebec a veto over future constitutional amendments-a pledge made as an inducement to encourage Quebec voters to reject secession. 24 The Regional Veto Law does for Quebec the same thing it does for the other regions of Canada, with the exception of the North. 25 It gives them each a veto in the constitutional amendment process. 26 The veto may be exercised by Ontario, Quebec, British Columbia and at least two provinces from each of the Atlantic and Prairie regions where the two represent at least half of the regional population. 27 The Regional Veto Law gives the veto to these regions indirectly through the federal government. 28 It requires a Cabinet minister to first obtain the consent of each of the five major regions as well as a majority of all provinces before introducing a major amendment proposal under the multilateral default amendment procedure. 29 The Regional Veto Law therefore confers a functional veto, not a formal one.
A. Ordinary Lawmaking
The Regional Veto Law has two important consequences. 25. An Act Respecting Constitutional Amendments, supra note 23, § 1( 1).
Id.

29.
Id. Canada's Constitution entrenches five amendment procedures. Three of them already give each of the affected provinces a veto over an amendment: the unilateral provincial procedure, the regional amendment procedure and the unanimity procedure. The fourth-the unilateral federal procedure-authorizes Parliament to amend its own internal constitution, and therefore makes no provision for provincial involvement. It is the fifth procedure-the multilateral default amendment procedure-that the Regional Veto Law was intended to address. See infra notes 58-67 and accompanying text.
under the Constitution's amendment rules into a deep formal inequality, giving special status to Ontario, Quebec and British Columbia and diminishing the power of the other seven provinces. 30 As Andrew Heard and Tim Swartz explain, the multilateral default amendment procedure has never really treated provinces as functional equals; populous provinces could always exercise more power than the others when they stood together. 31 The Regional Veto Law now formalizes and exacerbates what had before been only an implicit provincial inequality.
Second, the Regional Veto Law adds a new hurdle to what is already a difficult amendment process. It imposes a prior restraint on the power of Cabinet ministers to propose an amendment-something not contemplated by the constitutional amendment rules themselves. 32 It also complicates amendment under the multilateral default procedure by changing the sequence for a successful Parliament-initiated amendment: the Constitution requires federal proposal, then provincial ratification, but the Regional Veto Law now requires provincial consent, then federal proposal, and finally provincial ratification. 33 This has the potential to exacerbate amendment difficulty because the provincial government that would grant its consent prior to the federal proposal might differ from the one that controls the assembly when the time later comes to formally ratify the amendment. The Regional Veto Law, passed as a simple statute, therefore now constrains the federal government and indeed all constitutional actors contemplating major constitutional change. 
B. Extra-Legal Change
Turn now to what one prominent scholar has called the "frustrating puzzle" of Senate reform 34 -a subject of enduring debate since Confederation. 35 It took nearly 150 years for constitutional actors to change the Senate in any material way. 36 On January 19, 2016, the Minister of Democratic Institutions and the Government Leader in the House of Commons announced an Independent Advisory Board for Senate Appointments. 37 The Advisory Board is not formalized in a law. Its stated purpose is to create a "new, non-partisan, merit-based process to advise on Senate appointments." 38 Its larger purpose is to create an "independent appointments process" that will "contribute to creating a less partisan and more effective institution to serve Canadians." 39 According to the official release, the Advisory Board was "established to provide advice to the Prime Minister on candidates for the Senate" and will be "guided by public, merit-based criteria in order to identify Canadians who would make a significant contribution to the work of the Senate." 40 The Government moved expeditiously on Senate reform to secure the Senate's "fundamental role in the representation of regional and minority interests in the 
Id.
legislative process." 41 The Government established six categories of meritbased criteria. 42 The first relates to gender, indigenous, and minority status, with a view to gender balance in the Senate. 43 Non-partisanship and personal qualities of integrity and ethical conduct are also important, as is knowledge of the legislative process and the Constitution. 44 The Advisory Board will also look favorably on bilingual candidates and on nominees who have a record of leadership or achievement in public or community service, or in service to their profession or field of expertise. 45 The new Senate appointments process has unfolded in two phases. 46 During the first phase, called the "transitional process," the Advisory Board made appointment recommendations to the Prime Minister in early 2016 to fill Senate vacancies in Manitoba, Ontario and Quebec. 47 For each vacancy-five in total were identified-the Advisory Board prepared a list of five individuals who, in its estimation, deserve consideration for appointment to the Senate, and who "meet the constitutional eligibility requirements at the time of the appointment to the Senate." 48 The Advisory Board is said to have consulted broadly to ensure that a "diverse slate of individuals with a variety of backgrounds, skills, knowledge and experience" required for a well-functioning Senate were nominated for the Board's consideration. 49 The Prime Minister ultimately nominated seven women and men to the Senate, three from Ontario and two each from Manitoba and Quebec. 50 The second phase in the new process was launched in July 2016. 51 It is described as "the permanent phase of the independent Senate appointments process," a process that now "features an application process that is open to all Canadians." 52 The first round of the application process was open for a four-week period ending on August 4, 2016. 53 In this permanent phase, the Advisory Board will be guided by the same criteria as the first "with the end goal of ensuring a high standard of integrity, collaboration, and nonpartisanship in the Senate. Successful constitutions divide into two main groups: those that are short, contain statements of abstract principles, and are difficult to amend; and those that are long, contain detailed provisions, and are relatively easy to amend. . . . Canada has a constitution that is difficult to amend yet includes many details. Not surprising, this approach has proven unsuccessful. We have the worst of both worlds. 55 The Constitution of Canada entrenches an escalating structure of five procedures of formal amendment. 56 Each may be used to amend specifically designated provisions and principles, and each rises in difficulty according to the importance of its associated provisions or principles. 57 Although some of the five amendment procedures are relatively easy and others are not, the complexity of the entire package of formal amendment rules may make the Constitution of Canada the most difficult in the democratic world to amend-not necessarily a badge of honor. 58 
Minister of Democratic Institutions Announces Launch of the Permanent
A. The Rules of Constitutional Amendment
The lowest amendment threshold is the unilateral provincial procedure. It authorizes a provincial assembly to unilaterally amend the provincial constitution. 59 The nextlowest threshold, the unilateral federal procedure, confers an analogous power upon the Parliament of Canada: the power to unilaterally amend what Ian Greene has described as 55 Parliament's internal constitution 60 and matters relating exclusively "to the executive government of Canada or the Senate and House of Commons." 61 The third amendment route, the regional amendment procedure, incorporates the major feature of the unilateral federal amendment procedure: it applies to amendments affecting "one or more, but not all, provinces" and requires the consent of the House of Commons and Senate, and also the approval of the legislative assemblies of the affected provinces. 62 This procedure must be used for amendments that have a provincial-federal interest in relation to at least one province and be at most regional, not national, in scope. 63 The two remaining amendment procedures are the most difficult. The multilateral default procedure applies to all subjects not otherwise assigned to a specific amendment procedure. It applies also exclusively to a specially designated class of subjects including proportional representation in the House of Commons, the powers and membership of the Senate (including the method of senatorial selection), the Supreme Court of Canada for all items except its composition, the creation of new provinces, and the boundaries between provinces and territories. 64 A successful amendment under this procedure requires approval from both federal and provincial actors: the House of Commons and the Senate, as well the provincial legislative assemblies of at least two-thirds of the provinces whose aggregate population amounts to at least half of the national total. 65 This is an onerous threshold by any measure.
The unanimity procedure is even more difficult than the multilateral default procedure. It requires the approval of both houses of Parliament and each provincial legislative assembly. 66 This procedure must be used for amendments involving the monarchy, the right to provincial representation in the House of Commons relative to the Senate, Canada's official languages beyond their provincial or regional use, the composition of the Supreme Court of Canada, and Canada's formal amendment rules themselves. 67 Each of these five procedures, then, requires a greater quantum of agreement than the former, from a simple unicameral majority to successfully pass an amendment using the unilateral provincial procedure all the way up to the agreement of all federal and provincial legislatures, under the unanimity rule. In this escalating structure of amendment, the difficulty of amendment rises according to the importance of the amendable matter, the variable being the degree of provincial consent required for ratification.
B. The Constitution in Comparative Perspective
By comparison with other democratic constitutions, the Constitution of Canada may well be the most rigid, but only as to matters that Peter Russell has identified as involving "mega constitutional politics." The term refers to amendments that "address the very nature of the political community on which the constitution is based," 68 that have a "tendency to touch citizens' sense of identity and self- worth," 69 and those that are "concerned with reaching agreement on the identity and fundamental principles of the body politic." 70 The escalating structure of amendment identifies which matters trigger mega constitutional politics: the ones amenable by either the default multilateral amendment procedure, or the unanimity procedure. Both authorize major reforms to the basic structure of the Constitution, for instance to the framework of government, to the polity, to Canadian identity, or to federal-provincial relations.
We cannot know for certain whether these amendment procedures do in fact make the Canadian Constituion the most difficult to amend because the leading comparative study of constitutional rigidity has excluded Canada from the study sample. 71 The reason why is telling. Donald Lutz, the political scientist who created the index, admitted that he could not reliably determine what has constitutional status in Canada, and therefore what counts as an amendment to its Constitution. 72 However, had he measured these two onerous amendment procedures in Canada, he might have found that they rank the country ahead of the difficulty score Lutz had calculated for the United States (5.10), the most rigid constitution in his 36-country sample. 73 Using Lutz's own methodology, which quantifies every possible step in a formal amendment process and then 69. Id. aggregates the scores of each discrete step in a given amendment procedure to generate its index of difficulty, we arrive at an index of 4.50 for the multilateral default procedure, and 5.00 for the unanimity procedure. 74 
Id.
is-has made it possible for constitutional actors to exploit the blurred distinction between constitutional and ordinary law to create quasi-constitutional amendments that may later mature into constitution-level changes. As I will suggest below, quasi-constitutional amendments are not fated to achieve constitutional status, though in some circumstances, they may well become as durable as formal constitutional amendments.
III. THE CONSEQUENCE OF FORMAL AMENDMENT DIFFICULTY
Equally telling is that many of the most formally rigid constitutional democracies have generated the phenomenon of quasi-constitutional amendment. It is no coincidence that constitutional actors in Canada, the United States, and Australia have have found recourse in sub-constitutional means to make constitution-level changes. These constitutions are extraordinarily difficult to amend, 76 perhaps even constructively unamendable for all but the 74 . See Albert, supra note 58, at 94, 99-100.
Id. at 99-100.
76. See Lutz, supra note 11, at 170 tbl.5.7. most routine matters of governance. 77 The impetus behind quasi-constitutional amendment, then, is the difficulty of formal amendment.
A. The Legacies of Formal Amendment Failure
Where constitutional actors determine, correctly or not, that the current political landscape would frustrate their plans for a constitutional amendment to entrench new policy preferences, they resort instead to sub-constitutional means whose successful execution requires less or perhaps even no cross-party or inter-institutional coordination. Their resort to sub-constitutional procedures reflects a strategic choice to circumvent the onerous rules of formal amendment in order to alter the operation of a set of existing norms in the constitution. In Canada, the political choice to chart a subconstitutional path to constitutional change has been informed, if not compelled, by the modern legacies of formal amendment failure. of constitutional amendment. 79 Yet both major packages of amendments were defeated, the Meech Lake Accord as a result of an elapsed ratification deadline, 80 and the Charlottetown Accord at the hands of the people in an extraconstitutional referendum. 81 These failures have not been without consequence. Writing in 1994, Edward McWhinney observed that "Canadians as a whole are tired of the seemingly unending constitutional debate of the last three and half decades which has pre-empted consideration by Ottawa of other, deemed more pressing, economic problems." 82 Beyond just constitutional fatigue, however, Warren Newman has more recently suggested that formal amendment failure has had an "incalculable impact on our national psyche and on the way in which our political actors approach the question of constitutional reform." 83 Newman described the effect of our formal amendment failure as a "trauma," and concluded that "[i]t may not yet be a propitious time for Canada's political leaders to 'reopen' the Constitution in a broad and concerted way." 84 The time may never yet come. government was routed at the polls not coincidentally the year after Charlottetown's defeat. 85 Whether Canadians would be open to a new round of major constitutional change is an empirical question in need of fresh data drawn from generations since Meech Lake and Charlottetown. But perception often overruns reality, and today we regard constitutional politics in Canada as inhospitable to major formal constitutional reforms due to what Michael Lusztig has described as the need for "mass input" and "legitimization," 86 shorthand for the nearly impossible political agreement by parties with incommensurable interests that almost inevitably doom comprehensive constitutional change involving federalism.
B. The New Path to Institutional Reform
No wonder, then, that a non-constitutional path to institutional reform has replaced the constitutional route. As Harvey Lazar observed in 1997, this is "a necessary step for healing the wounds of the country", 87 certainly "the only politically viable option for managing the federation" 88 after decades of nearly uninterrupted attention to constitutionlevel changes. 89 Whether on fiscal, social, environmental, or aboriginal policy, constitutional actors carefully avoid the "cword." 90 "circuitous" ways that "changes of a constitutional character" occur now and likely into the near future 91 given the present political improbability of constitutional amendment.
Resort to sub-constitutional means is a more profitable route for constitutional actors because it requires less or even no cross-party or inter-institutional coordination. Both the Regional Veto Law and the Advisory Board for Senate appointments were the product of a majority government, meaning that neither major change confronted any substantial risk of failure. Each was promised near-certain success in light of the few veto opportunities standing in their way. Neither of these functionally constitution-level changes required support from the opposition or the provinces to become effective, though one could argue that each of them changed the basic structure of the Constitution, and therefore should have required a deeper measure of approval across political parties or levels of government.
The Regional Veto Law and the new process for Senate appointments were introduced at a much lower political cost than ordinarily required for an amendment, yet both amount to the functional equivalent of a formal amendment. Both, in fact, were part of the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords, though in different but recognizable forms: the precursor to the Regional Veto Law was proposed as a provincial veto and the new process for Senate appointments would have, in the case of Meech, given provinces the power of nomination, and in Charlottetown it would have created a Triple-E Senate. 92 The Regional Veto Law, an ordinary law, has had two extraordinary consequences. 92. See Meech Lake Accord, supra note 78 § § 2, 9; Charlottetown Accord, supra note 79, at 5. so outside of the formal amendment process. Quebec now has the veto promised to it. Moreover, the effect of the Regional Veto Law is substantial insofar as it effectively amends the rules of constitutional amendment by imposing formal requirements over and above those established by the Constitution itself. What is important here is that the Regional Veto Law changes the formal amendment rulesspecifically, the multilateral default procedure-by way of a simple federal law in defiance of the formal rules of amendment themselves which by their very text require the agreement of Parliament and of each provincial assembly to amend any part of the Constitution's formal amendment rules. 93 And yet the enacting Parliament expected constitutional actors to nonetheless abide by the Regional Veto Law despite its inconsistency with the formal rules of amendment. Even though it is an ordinary law that did not earn its functionally special status through any of the formal routes, the Constitution provides for achieving special status.
The new process for Senate appointments has likewise achieved what neither Meech nor Charlottetown could: it has changed the way Senators are selected. Reading the recent Senate Reference would suggest that changes to the method of senator selection require a constitutional amendment. The relevant issue in the Senate Reference was the constitutionality of the Senate Reform and Senate Appointments Consultation bills. 94 These bills proposed to create a framework of consultative provincial and territorial elections to fill Senate vacancies. The Senate Reform bill proposed that senators "should be chosen from a list of Senate nominees submitted by the government of the province or territory," 95 with the list of nominees "to be 
Bill C-7, An Act Respecting the Selection of Senators and Amending the
determined by an election held in the province or territory." 96 The bill furthermore insisted that the prime minister "must consider names from the most current list of Senate nominees selected for that province or territory" when "recommending Senate nominees to the Governor General." 97 The Senate Appointments Consultation bill had the same objective: to constrain the prime minister to consider provincial or territorial consultative election winners for appointment to the Senate. 98 The operative question in the Senate Reference was "whether Parliament, acting alone, can reform the Senate by creating consultative elections to select senatorial nominees endorsed by the populations of the various provinces and territories." 99 The Court rejected the two major arguments for the bills. 100 First, the Court was not convinced by the argument that creating a framework for consultative senatorial elections does not constitute an amendment simply because the formal process for appointing individuals to the Senate-by official summoning by the Governor General on the advice of the prime minister, as required by the 1867 Constitution Act 101 -remains unchanged. 102 The Court refused to accept this argument because, the Court observed, doing so would "privilege[] form over substance," 103 and would ignore that such a change "would fundamentally alter the architecture of the Constitution." 104 An amendment, then, according to the Court, is more than a formal alteration to the constitutional text, 105 though the Court could have been more definitive on what in fact counts as an amendment. 106 Nor was the Court persuaded that the text of the formal amendment rules is unclear; on the contrary, the Court noted that the multilateral default amendment procedure states plainly that it must be used for changes to "the method of selecting senators." 107 For the Court, this phrase "covers the implementation of consultative elections, indicating that a constitutional amendment is required and making that amendment subject to the general procedure [in Section 38]." 108 The Court continued: "[t]he words 'the method of selecting senators' include more than the formal appointment of senators by the Governor General." 109 It includes all changes to the method of senatorial selection, beyond and including those related directly to the act of appointment itself. 110 Yet today senators are selected under a new process that differs from how they have historically been chosen. The Senate has been reformed, but not in the large-scale fashion many have sought since Confederation; change has instead come incrementally, without engaging the formal 104 amendment process. 111 Formal appointment continues to be made by the Governor General, but the selection process itself has changed as a result of the Advisory Board which advises the prime minister according to public criteria that now bring to light at least part of what has in the past remained concealed. Whether the new process for Senate appointments is an improvement on the previous method of senator selection is not the point, although it does seem to democratize a body that has long been inaccessible to many Canadians. 112 The point is that senator selection has changed in a material way. Although the prime minister retains the discretion to choose whom to nominate, the range of discretion is narrowed. The creation of the Advisory Body is a significant change that would have been appropriately passed as a constitutional amendment had it been possible to amend the Constitution without opening the door to collateral matters. Paradoxically, the choice not to formalize the new process in a law, and instead to promulgate it informally, has perhaps saved it from unconstitutionality. Yet there can be no doubt that the new process is in fact new, and that it changes the way senators are selected-for better or worse.
What remains to be seen about both the Regional Veto Law and the new process of Senate appointments is whether they will endure with time. Under the right conditions, a quasi-constitutional amendment may ultimately grow as durable as a formal amendment, and it may be that the conditions surrounding both the Regional Veto Law and the new process are right for them to endure.
There are at least three conditions that foster the durability of a quasi-constitutional amendment. First, the amendment must concern an important matter of public policy. Second, the matter must be one that has in the past proven difficult to resolve by amendment. Third, the amendment must bring relative constitutional peace to the issue, defusing the subject and removing it from the foreground of the political process. The Regional Veto Law and the new process of Senate appointments appear to meet each of these three conditions, which perhaps explains why the Quebec question has for now receded to the background of constitutional politics in Canada, as well as why reform regarding the perennially controversial question about the proper role, membership, and function of the Senate may soon follow. Constitutional actors are instead focusing on other matters deemed higher priorities-at least in some part a function of the success of the quasi-constitutional amendments that were introduced outside of the formal process of constitutional amendment.
There is an important difference between the quasiconstitutional amendment resulting from the Regional Veto Law and the one resulting from the new process of Senate appointments: the former emerged from the legislative process and the latter did not. This difference-call it the difference between executive-led quasi-constitutional amendments and Parliament-led quasi-constitutional amendments-may lead us to conclude that one is more legitimate than the other insofar as the legislative process is ordinarily more public, transparent, and deliberative than the decision-making process that occurs almost exclusively internally within the executive branch.
CONCLUSION: CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ITS MODERN FORMS
I have sought in this brief overview to identify a concept and to illustrate it with three examples, one prior to Patriation, and two afterwards. There may well be others, including perhaps the Clarity Act passed into law after the Quebec Secession Reference. 113 The takeaway is that quasiconstitutional amendments occupy the space between constitutional and ordinary law. Neither constitutional nor ordinary, they float sometimes uneasily between these two worlds, complicating our understanding of how a constitution is made, what it is, and where to find it.
A. The Paradoxes of Quasi-Constitutionality
Perhaps because of their unsteady status, quasiconstitutional amendments raise two paradoxes for the theory and doctrine of constitutional change. First, although they become effective with recourse to sub-constitutional means, quasi-constitutional amendments may nonetheless over time acquire constitutional status as a result of their subject-matter or importance. This reflects a mismatch between their adoption and their effect. Ordinarily, special status derives at least in part from an equally special period of creation, whether by constitutional amendment requiring heightened legislative or popular thresholds or a selfconscious recognition and attendant declaration by the enacting body that the law or measure demands special solicitude.
Second, although quasi-constitutional amendments may rank higher than ordinary law in the constitutional hierarchy, they may sometimes be closer to unconstitutionality than constitutionality. Precisely because they arise sub-constitutionally, yet purport to and maybe in fact do enjoy special status in legislatures, in courts of law, or in the public square, quasi-constitutional amendments cannot validly claim the legal, sociological, and procedural legitimacy that constitutionality requires. It is true that the absence of one form of legitimacy need not always result in 113 . See generally An Act to give effect to the requirement for clarity as set out in the opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Quebec Secession Reference, 2d Sess., 36th Parl., 1999.
unconstitutionality. For instance, the adoption of the United States Constitution in violation of the rules of change in the Articles of Confederation shows how sociological legitimacy may overcome procedural illegality. 114 This, however, is an exception to the general rule that constitutional status derives from the convergence of legal recognition, sociological acceptance, and procedural correctness. Because quasiconstitutional amendments lack these three features, they quite controversially verge on the border of unconstitutionality, and indeed courts would be justified in invalidating them even in the face of high popular and political support for these constitution-level changes made sub-constitutionally. The Regional Veto Law, for example, is quite possibly unconstitutional. I believe the same to be true of provincial laws requiring binding referenda before provincial assemblies can consider ratifying an amendment proposal. 115 Yet quasi-constitutional amendments have an important function in constitutional democracies. They offer constitutional actors a way to update the constitution informally without recourse to onerous rules of constitutional amendment. If these rules were followed without exception for any constitution-level change, they could effectively freeze the constitution and fate it to a chronic incapacity to respond to the modern challenges of evolving political and cultural norms and of changing social and economic conditions. This interplay between constitutional and ordinary rules of change can be understood in terms of Heather Gerken's hydraulics theory of constitutional change: where the path to formal amendment is or seems to be blocked due to its difficulty, constitutional actors redirect their energies toward 114 . See 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 84 (1998). alternative paths to produce the same or a similar outcome, though with a different form. 116 
B. Constitutional Form and the Rule of Law
The question, then, is whether anything of significance turns on form. In Canada, we can look to the Supreme Court for guidance as to why form matters. The answer is, quite simply, the rule of law. The Court has articulated a textcentric conception of the rule of law "requir[ing] that courts give effect to the Constitution's text, and apply, by whatever its terms, legislation that conforms to that text." 117 These positivist foundations of the rule of law are not without normative commitments. Indeed, the Court has explained that the rule of law entails respect for three principles: the supremacy of law over both public and private actors, the legal regulation of interactions between public and private actors, and the establishment and maintenance of positive laws that reflect an order of normative values. 118 For the Court, it is the text that should drive the evolution of law. The Court has moreover suggested that normative values, however they may be discovered and applied, must cohere with the text: the rule of law, the Court wrote, "is not an invitation to trivialize or supplant the Constitution's written terms." 119 Constitutional actors have pushed the boundaries of constitutional form in their pursuit of constitutional reform. 120 Whether the reforms are needed is only one question; another perhaps more important one probes the consequences of making major constitutional changes outside of the formal rules of constitutional change entrenched in the Constitution of Canada.
In one view, quasi-constitutional amendments undermine the integrity of the Constitution because they trade on the vulnerabilities of constitutional form. They exploit the partially codified and uncodified nature of the Constitution of Canada to introduce from the back door changes that are not possible through the front. The longterm results are uncertainty about what has constitutional status, a disjunction between constitutional text and practice, and no clear roadmap for how constitutional actors may change the constitution or whether the rules in the constitutional text reflect either the necessary or sufficient conditions for constitutional reform.
In another view, quasi-constitutional amendment is an innovative strategy to update a rigid constitution that otherwise frustrates constitutional reform. It matters less how we change the constitution than that it changes at all because the constitution should reflect the preferences of constitutional actors and the people they represent. Where the constitution ceases to accommodate the needs of the community it governs, it exposes itself as a tool of governance poorly designed to serve its intended function. The argument from this view would continue as follows: were constitutional actors to deny themselves recourse to innovations like quasiconstitutional amendment, the consequence could be that the constitution fails to endure in moments when the pressure for change continues to build over a long period of time without the possibility of any change ever bringing relief. Constitutional actors have forged new paths to institutional reform outside of the formal rules of constitutional change. 122 Whether these paths point the way to the future remains to be seen, but there is yet no sign to suggest otherwise. Constitutional actors have grown comfortable operating in the space between constitutional and ordinary law, though perhaps less out of preference than out of necessity. But only so much constitutional change is possible through judicial interpretation, particularly where the targets of change are "hard-wired" into the constitution, and not as cleanly changeable by interpretation 123 as might be the case for interpreting a right cast at a high level of abstraction. On matters of constitutional structure, constitutional actors today may have no other option but quasi-constitutional amendment because the road to major formal amendment appears closed.
Many questions present themselves for future research. I raise two of them here. First, what should be the process for repealing or revising a quasi-constitutional amendment? They are ordinarily entrenched, and therefore subject to ordinary repeal or revision in terms of the parliamentary threshold required. But so are quasi-constitutional statutes, with the important wrinkle that they may be repealed or revised only with clear legislative language. Should the same rule apply to quasi-constitutional amendments? Second, given the extraordinary difficulty of formal amendment in Canada, should we not expect to see more quasiconstitutional amendments-many more than the ones identified in this Article? The first question requires a more elaborate answer than is possible in these pages. The answer to the second likewise requires more research to explain, but is a bit less of a mystery. Much of the change we would expect to see as a result of the rigidity of the Constitution has been A COMPARA.TIVE PERSPECTIVE ON EUROPE, CANADA AND THE USA 51, 56-57 (Xenophon Contiades ed., 2013).
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